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NULLIFICATION-A SLOGAN OR A PROCESS
OF GOVERNMENT
"Nullification is the safety valve which helps a self-
governing community avoid the alternative between
tyranny and revolution."-Arthur Twining Hadley.
I.
In the voluminous literature dealing with prohibition much
has been written on the question whether the American
people have under their form of. government, any feasible
alternative strategy that can be constitutionally exercised
in the near future to alleviate the present reign of hypocrisy,
corruption and oppression. It seems to be the unanimous
opinion of students of the problem, that repeal of the Eight-
eenth Amendment is beyond the realm of possibilities in the
near future. If that is so, then any suggestions for a sub-
stitute amendment 1 that would involve a repeal of the
present amepdment, or of an amendment to the Eighteenth
Amendment such as is proposed by Col. Anderson ' of the
Wickersham Commission, would be outside the scope of pos-
sible remedies, say within the next decade. Let us assume
further that the Volstead Act cannot be repealed because
of opposition in the United States Senate, where equality
of representation for each state exists, and wherein the rural
and agricultural elements predominate. Under these cir-
custances, the Hon. James M. Beck ' has suggested that
the best present strategy for the wets would be for the
House of Representatives to refuse to appropriate money for
enforcement. At the very outside, 218 members and per-
haps less than 200 members, could bring this about, because
of absentees and non-voters. Mr. Beck says, "No student of
1 Prof. Zechariah Chafee in the Forum for January, 1931.
2 The Henry W. Anderson Plan in the Wickersham Report.
S N. Y. Times-Special Feature -Article, Jan. 18, 1931, § 9, p. xx.
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our constitutional history can question the power of the
House of Representatives over the purse of the nation. To
this chamber was especially committed the right to initiate
all revenue legislation, and its power of disbursement is
wholly discretionary and could not be called into question by
any judicial body. Its sole responsibility is to the Ameri-
can electorate." He then predicts that "there will be in the
Seventy-second Congress at least 130 members who oppose
federal prohibition. If the American people will wake up
and send seventy more, the problem of prohibition can be
solved by the speediest and most practicable method and
with such ease that many will then wonder why for so long
a time they were content to waste hundreds of millions of
dollars and sacrifice some thousands of lives to enforce an
unenforceable and iniquitous law."
The purpose of this article is to show that the James M.
Beck nostrum of nullification will not solve the prohibition
problem. His suggestion is only a beginning. As such, it
is valuable and necessary. But like so many others who
have been fascinated by and who have declared their alle-
giance to the idea of nullification as the way out of the pro-
hibition muddle, he has failed to realize the potential perils
implicit in a negative policy. To Mr. Beck, nullification is
nothing more than a slogan albeit one of. tremendous pro-
paganda value. It shall be our purpose to show the po-
tentialities of nullification as a process of government.
Suppose Congress would refuse to appropriate money for
the prohibition unit, or even suppose that Congress would
repeal the Volstead Act and that the wet states would re-
peal their enforcement statutes, this would not constitute a
solution of the problem. It would not even satisfy the wets.
Before nullification can be advocated as an effective process
of government for solving the prohibition problem, it is in-
cumbent on the adherents to show (1) that it is possible to
raise revenue from the liquor traffic and (2) that it is pos-
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sible to regulate the traffic without having either the revenue
or the regulatory laws declared unconstitutional as in viola-
tion of the Eighteenth Amendment that is still in the Con-
stitution and cannot be repealed. If these two things can
not be accomplished as long as the sumptuary law remains
in the Constitution, then any talk of nullification is futile.
An unregulated and a non-revenue producing liquor traffic
is unthinkable as a solution of the prohibition problem. We
shall attempt to show that both of these conditions can be
satisfied in a constitutional manner without authorizing what
the Eighteenth Amendment condemns.
II.
Assuming that state and federal enforcement acts are re-
pealed (or that the federal government resorts to indirect
nullification by failure to appropriate money for enforce-
ment) can the state and the federal governments constitu-
tionally tax the liquor traffic without authorizing what the
Eighteenth Amendment condemns? Three contentions have
been advanced against such a proceeding: (1) That by tax-
ing the business the government recognizes its lawful char-
acter and sanctions its existence; (2) That taxation and pro-
tection are reciprocal; and (3) That for the government to
participate in the profits of an illegal business would consti-
tute the acceptance of tainted money. Insofar as a state
government is concerned, every one of these contentions was
repudiated in a well reasoned case decided by the Supreme
Court of Michigan in 1875. One of the greatest jurists that
this country has produced, Thomas M. Cooley, spoke for a
unanimous court in the case of Youngblood v. Sexton.4
As to the first contention, Judge Cooley replied that taxes
are not favors; they are burdens. They are necessary, it is
true, to the existence of government; but they are not the
less burdens, and are only submitted to because of necessity.
It would be a remarkable proposition, under such circum-
4 32 Michigan 406 (1875).
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stances, that a thing is sanctioned and countenanced by the
government, when this burden which may prove disastrous,
is imposed upon it, while on the other hand, it is frowned
upon and condemned when the burden is withheld. It is
safe to predict that if such were the legal doctrine, any citi-
zen would prefer to be visited with the untaxed frowns of
government rather than with those testimonials of approval
which are represented by the demands of the tax gatherer.
It is the usual practice for states to exempt educational and
charitable institutions from taxes. If the argument advanced
is valid, we do not see why the state should not have evi-
denced its approbation of educational and charitable insti-
tutions by taking special care that they should feel its bur-
dens, while at the same time it stigmatized other things
which were regarded as immoral and pernicious, by refusing
to permit them to appear on the tax list. A tax roll would
thus become an honor roll. Further, the taxation of a thing
may be and often is, when police purposes are had in view,
a means of expressing disapproval instead of approbation of
what is taxed.
The second contention contains a transparent fallacy. If
the tax upon any particular thing was the consideration for
the protection given to the owner in respect to it, the con-
tention might have some validity. But the maxim of reci-
procity in taxation has no such meaning. No government
ever undertakes to tax all that it protects. If a government
were to levy only poll taxes, it would not be on the idea that
it was to protect only the persons of its citizens, leaving
their property to rapine and plunder. On the other hand,
if a state taxed only real property, it would be a fanciful
suggestion that real property was entitled to special pro-
tection in consequence.
As to the third contention, if this is tainted money, the
state, to be consistent, ought to decline to receive fines for
criminal offenses with the same emphasis that it would refuse
to collect a tax from an obnoxious business.
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As early as 1811, a Georgia court construing a state stat-
ute that imposed a tax of $1,000 on a faro table used for the
purpose of gambling in every different county in which it
was so used, held that the use of the faro table for the pur-
pose of gambling is not rendered lawful by the tax imposed
on the instrument.' So a tax statute is not unconstitutional
because it imposes a privilege tax upon a business made un-
lawful by another statute.6 So it has been, held that the
fact that a business was prohibited, and license could not be
obtained authorizing it, was no defense to an action to col-
lect the tax imposed from one engaged in such business.'
It is well settled that a tax may be imposed for purposes of
revenue or under the police power for purposes of regula-
tion or prohibition. If it is used for purposes of prohibi-
tion, it constitutes a penalty for carrying on the prohibited
business.' Liquor license fees, in the- days before the Vol-
stead Act, were almost unanimously held to be not a tax
but an exercise of the police power because regulation was
the predominant purpose of the fees.' From the foregoing
authorities, it should be clear that a state can impose a
license tax upon a business that is prohibited and the law
will not authorize what the Eighteenth Amendment con-
demns.
When we turn to the federal government, we find Mr.
Justice Day speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of United States v. Yugino-
vitch "o laying down the proposition that "Congress, under
the taxing power, may tax any intoxicating liquors notwith-
standing their production is prohibited; and the fact that
it does so for a moral end as well as to raise revenue, is not
5 State v. Doon and Dimon, R. L. Charlt. 1 (Ga. 1811).
6 State ex rel. Melton v. Rombach, 73 So. 731 (Miss. 1917).
7 Foster v. Speed, Ill S. W. 925 (Tenn. 1908); Brunswick-Balke-Colender
Co. V. Mecklenburg County, 107 S. E. 317 (N. C. 1921).
8 State ex rel. English v. Fanning, 96 Neb. 123, 147 N. W. 215 (1914).
9 Henry v. State, 26 Ark. 523 (1871); Burch v. Savannah, 42 Ga. 596
(1871); Pleuler v. State, 10 N. W. 481 (1881).
10 256 U. S. 450 (1920).
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a constitutional objection." In United States v. Sullivan 11
Mr. Justice Holmes, again speaking for a unanimous court,
holds "that gains from illicit traffic in liquor are subject to
the income tax." To the bootlegger, the idea of "protec-
tion" money is not a novel one. But in addition, the gov-
ernment, under a scheme of constitutional prohibition can
say to this member of an outlaw class, "You must also con-
tribute to the support of the federal sleuths who regard you
as legitimate prey." The defendant in the Sullivan case
failed to make out any income tax return and he relied as a
defense on the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth
Amendment. Mr. Justice Holmes said, "It would be an
extreme if not, an extravagant application of the Fifth
Amendment to say that it authorized a man to refuse to state
the amount of his income because it had been made in
crime..... He could not draw a conjurer's circle around the
whole matter by his own declaration that to write any word
upon the government blank would bring him into danger of
the law." 12 In United States v. One Ford Coupe Auto-
mobile "' the court held that intoxicating liquor, though
made for beverage purposes in violation of the Volstead Act,
is subject to tax. The reader should remember that these
three decisions were rendered at a time when the National
Prohibition Act was in full force and effect. A fortiori the
Federal government can tax when that act is repealed.
Further, under the doctrine of the License Tax Cases
Congress, under our hypothetical policy of nullification,
would be allowed to lay a license tax on intoxicants even in
a state that still embraced the policy of state prohibition
on the theory that the federal license did not "convey to the
licensee any authority to carry on the licensed business with-
in the state." In this case the court said:
11 274 U. S. 256 (1926).
12 274 U. S. 259, 263, 264 (1926).
13 272'U. S. 321 (1926).
14 5 Wall. 462 (1866). See also Pervear v. Commonwealth of Mass., 5
Wall. 475 (1866)..
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"The recognition by the Acts of Congress, of the power and right of
the state to tax, control or regulate any business carried on within its
limits, is entirely consistent with an intention on the part of Congress
to tax such business for national purposes."
The licenses give no authority and are merely receipts for
taxes. There is ample authority to avoid the intolerable
situation of a non-productive liquor traffic under a policy of
nullification.
III.
Professor McBain, in his book "Prohibition Legal and
Illegal," "5 maintains that "if Congress failed to provide for
national enforcement of national prohibition, and if the wet
states failed to adopt prohibition as a state policy, the liquor
business in such states would flourish on a scale and under
conditions of uncontrol never before tolerated. The old
saloon would be as nothing compared with the lawless new
saloon. Any conceivable state regulation, short of prohibi-
tion itself, would be a violation of the prohibition adamantly
prescribed by the Eighteenth Amendment. This would be
intolerable .... (The states) could not merely regulate, for
that would be to legalize what is unqualifiedly forbidden."
If this opinion is correct, nullification as a process of govern-
ment is a travesty.
It is our contention that if federal and state enforcement
acts were repealed, it would be possible for the states, un-
der the police power, to regulate the liquor traffic without
authorizing anything that the Eighteenth Amendment con-
demns. By a system of negative regulations the state can
penalize what it wants to penalize and in this manner it can
control the time and place and occasion of the sale, the
quantity and quality of liquor and the persons to whom
liquor may be sold. As an example, a state statute pro.
viding that liquor shall not be sold to minors and containing
a penalty therefor, does not by implication sanction the sale
15 Pp. 38-39.
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of liquor to adults. The writer is indebted to Mr. Clarence
Darrow for the idea of negative regulation. The proposal
has been submitted to 'two of the outstanding scholars in the
field of constitutional law, Professors Felix Frankfurter and
Thomas Reed Powell of the Harvard Law School, and both
declare that the scheme is within the scope of constitutional
possibilities.
We desire at this point to introduce the arguments in favor
of the proposal. (1) By way of introduction it is necessary
to distinguish between "regulation" and "prohibition." Pro-
fessor Freund, in his work on "The Police Power," 1 - says:
"By prohibition is understood that legislative policy which renders
illegal some entire sphere of business or action, and not merely some
particular mode or form of it, or merely its exercise at a particular
time or in a particular place, so that it would still be possible to engage
in the same pursuit by an accomodation to legal requirements. With
reference to any particular subject matter therefore, partial prohibi-
tion constitutes regulation."
As an example, to prohibit the use of grain for distillation
into liquor is upon this principle mere regulation as far as
the owner of the grain is concerned."7 Let it be understood
that the plan we are advocating can only be characterized
as "regulation" under the above distinction. So much by
way of introduction.
(2) The fundamental principle that will justify the con-
stitutional validity of the proposal we are advocating is con-
tained in a doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of United States v. Lanza.18
The court said:
"To regard the (Eighteenth) Amendment as the source of the power
of the states to adopt and enforce prohibition measures is to take a
partial and erroneous view of the matter .... To be sure, the first
section of the Amendment took from the states all power to authorize
acts falling within its prohibition, but it did not cut down or displace
prior state laws not inconsistent with it. Such laws derive their force,
16 P 52.
17 Ingram v. State, 39 Ala. 247, 84 Am. Dec. 782 (1864).
18 260 U. S. 377, 381-382 (1922).
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as do all new ones consistent with it, not from this Amendment, but
from power originally belonging to the states, preserved to them by
the Tenth Amendment, and now relieved from the restriction hereto-
fore arising out of the Federal Constitution." 19
Two implications of vital significance to the validity of our
proposal can be drawn from the doctrine of this case'.
(A) Since the states do not derive their power to legislate
concerning intoxicating liquor from the Eighteenth Amend-
ment, then it follows that there is no constitutional duty up-
on the states to adopt a policy of state prohibition. 20
(B) Since the source of the states' power over intoxicating
liquor is the police power, there is no constitutional obliga-
tion on the part of the states to exercise their legislative
power to the hilt and in such a manner that it will be co-
extensive with the drastic sumptuary legislation comprising
the first article of the Eighteenth Amendment.
(3) The states, under the police power, may select and
choose the evils that they want to punish. The sanction of
a law passed in the exercise of the police power is usually
a penalty, and the violation of the law constitutes technical-
ly a misdemeanoi or a crime."' A state may classify with
reference to an evil to be prevented. A lack of abstract
symmetry does not matter. The question is a practical one
dependent upon experience.22 Justice Holmes has said:
"The state may direct its law -against what it deems the evil as it
actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses." 23
The presumption is that the legislature acted with knowl-
edge of the facts and conditions.24 It has been held that the
states "need not denounce every act committed within their
19 The court said that the restriction referred to was "chiefly the commerce
clause."
20 See McBAIN, PRoHmBITioN LEGAL AND IzEGIAL, pp. 29, 30, 31, .32, 34, 39.
21 FREUND's PoLicE POWER, p. 21.
22 2 CooLEY'S CoNSIuTIONAL LimTTIOrs, (8th ed.), p. 813.
25 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1913).
24 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTrONAL LIMITATIONS, (8th ed.), p. 372, note I for list
of cases.
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boundaries which is included within the inhibition of the
Volstead Act, nor provide the same penalities therefor." 25
An illustration will aid in making clear the proposition we
are defending. The state of Montana repealed its state pro-
hibition law.2" But in another section of the Code there is
still on the statute books a law providing for a penalty for
the sale of liquor to minors." Does any one doubt that a
violator of that law does not commit an offense against the
state for which he can be punished? Does any one contend
that such a law sanctions or authorizes the sale of liquor
to adults? That law constitutes a typical illustration of
what we designate as a negative regulation under a system
of state nullification. If that law is valid, it is not within
the constitutional competency of a state under the police
power to make selling of liquor on Sunday an offense? And
if that can be done, why is it not possible to provide for a
general regulation of the time, place and manner of sale,
the quality and quantity of liquor sold and the place of
consumption? The state can attack the evil piece-meal.
It can prohibit what it wants to prohibit and provide punish-
ment for that. Each separate section constitutes a pro-
hibition, but viewing the problem as a whole the policy could
be characterized as negative regulation. It would not re-
quire extraordinary adroitness in drafting such legislation
to keep free from drifting into the position in which the
state would be positively legalizing that which the Eight-
eenth Amendment condemns. Professor Freund, the great
authority on the police power, has said:
"The police power has dealt with and deals with evils as public senti-
ment requires, and that other evils of a different kind affecting different
interests and having different consequences are not drawn within the
range of legislation or that they are regulated or restrained in a different
25 Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 236 Mass. 281, 128 N. E. 273 (1920).
26 REv. CODE OP MONT., Supp. 1923-27, § 11048.3, p. 1072.
27 REv. CODE Op MONT., op. cit. supra note 26, at § 11048.1.
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manner and treated with greater severity or leniency, is not deemed
sufficient to invalidate a measure otherwise legitimate, confining itself
to some particular danger." 28
The effect of such a policy will mean that where public
sentiment in a state allows it, all persons who are not within
the prescribed classes will be enabled to procure palatable
liquor under the circumstances and conditions permitted by
the state law. We are assuming here that the federal en-
forcement act has been repealed. Of course if the Volstead
Act still remains on the books, even though Congress fails
to appropriate mdney for its enforcement, many of these
pleasures may constitute offenses under that act, and the
violator may pay the penalty because of the zeal of some
law enforcement patriot. And finally it is comforting to re-
member that the Eighteenth Amendment contains no penal-
ties and is not self-enforcing.
It should be noted further that under a policy of nullifi-
cation (1) liquor manufacturers and dealers will not be
permitted to incorporate; and (2) contracts for the sale of
alcoholic beverages will not be enforcible in either state or
federal courts as long as the Eighteenth Amendment re-
mains in the Constitution. The absence of corporate and
credit facilities for the liquor traffic will constitute a dis-
tinct social advantage. We need fear no repetition of the
sinister machinations of the "Liquor Trust" in politics. Un-
der the new regime, the liquor business will be in the hands
of small producers and retailers and under circumstances
wherein the forces of competition will prevail as to quality
and price. Further the business will be limited to "cash
and carry" or "collect on delivery." 21
IV.
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that nullification
as ordinarily understood is simply a slogan, a method of at-
28 FREUND, op. cit. supra note 21, at p. 740.
29 See MANION, "What Will Become of Prohibition?" 6 NOTRE DAME L.
(1Q31) 332.
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tack, a strategic maneuver. The wets, who in desperation
are advocating it, have not thought the problem through.
As ordinarily understood it would lead to an intolerable sit-
uation. If nullification comes to pass, it should be as a
process of government permitting public opinion in each
state to regulate and tax the liquor fraffic as best suits its
interests. The revenue possibilities will encourage doubt-
ful states to fall into line. It may be that the Anderson
Plan, endorsed by several members of the Wickersham Com-
mission, will constitute a better permanent solution of the
problem. But it should not be forgotten that that plan
will require an amendment to the Eighteenth Amendment.
That one feature removes that proposal from the category
of a present practicable way out of the prohibition muddle.
The plan we have outlined affords the American people the
opportunity within the.next decade of enjoying the "pur-
suit of happiness" vouchsafed to us by our forebears.
Forrest Revere Black.
University of Kentucky, College of Law.
